By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim sicuro being the original ship, \(O\)
If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at per time. There seems esatto be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of verso thing by verso new exactly similar part preserves the identity of the thing. It follows that either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a scapolo part (or small portion) does not preserve identity (per view known as “mereological essentialism;” Chisholm 1973).
This can be seen (though it may already be clear) by considering a modified version of the ship of Theseus problem
As indicated, Kripke denies that his argument (for the necessity of origin) applies onesto the case of change over time: “The question whether the table could have changed into ice is irrelevant here” (1972, 1980). So the question whether \(O\) could change into \(S\) is supposedly “irrelevant.” But Kripke does not give per reason for this claim, and if cases of trans-temporal identity and trans-world identity differ markedly con relevant respects – respects relevant onesto Kripke’s argument for the necessity of origin, it is not obvious what they are. (But see Forbes 1985, and Lewis 1986, for dialogue.) The argument above was simply that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship since there is a possible world con which they differ.Read More »By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim sicuro being the original ship, \(O\)